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21 Introduction
The collective bargaining between a representative firm and a trade union1 is analyzed
in this paper from a dynamic perspective. The relationship between these two agents
is defined in a dynamic labor market, assuming a fixed workforce but a time-varying
demand for labor. In particular, the focus is on the progressive expansion or contraction
of the set of workers employed within the firm, and the evolution of the wage they earn.
The dynamic aspects of this interaction are based on the existence of adjustment costs
or, more precisely, frictional effects (FE).2 That is, on how the firm’s profits and the
union’s welfare are increased or reduced by the hiring of new employees or the firing
of existing ones.3 These FE crucially influence the speed of convergence towards the
medium-run equilibrium, and even determine the levels reached by the main variables
at the medium-run equilibrium.
We introduce two mechanisms which help dynamize the collective bargaining process
and which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been previously addressed by the
literature. Firstly, on the firm’s side a frictional effect depending on the wage rate
is added to the conventional adjustment costs which are exclusively dependent on the
number of employees being hired or laid off. These two-part FE will jointly drive the
dynamic behavior of the firm. Secondly, we also assume that the union’s behavior is
also affected by frictional effects. It is worth mentioning that this second mechanism is
different from the union membership dynamics, often treated in the literature (see, for
example the pioneer work by Kidd and Oswald 1987 and Jones 1987 and the more recent
Dittrich and Schirwitz 2011a), because we do not take into account a closed-shop but an
open-shop system of industrial relations. Thus, we assume that workers benefit from the
union’s achievements regardless of whether they are members or not. Put differently, the
union represents members and non-members identically. These kinds of industrial/labor
relations are typical in some countries in Continental Europe4.
The model developed in this paper could be included within the insider-outsider
1As Booth (2014) points out, although labor economists’ interest in trade unions has de-
clined in recent years, trade unions are still important agents in many OECD countries. One
of the reasons the author gives for this decline is the negligible role of trade unions in the US.
Notwithstanding, our theoretical framework is thought to model some features of European
labor markets.
2We explicitly avoid the term “adjustment costs” because, as will be shown later, the
frictional effects are really a “cost” for firing and for specific levels of hiring, but can be
considered “benefits” for specific levels of hiring.
3Our concept of FE encompasses some search frictions (e.g. those associated to the re-
cruitment process for the firm) but is not restricted to them. For instance, firing costs are
considered here as frictional effects, although they are not search frictions. A recent example
of a collective bargaining model mainly focused on search frictions is Dobbelaere and Luttens
(2016).
4For instance, Cahuc et al. (2014, p. 404) point out: “(. . . ) in France and Spain collective
agreements do not have the right to discriminate between union members and non-unionized
workers”.
3literature from a broad perspective. The four central assumptions on which an insider-
outsider model rests, (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001) are fulfilled: “(1) Firms face la-
bor turnover costs that they cannot entirely pass on to their employees. (2) Insiders
have some market power. (3) If entrants remain with a firm long enough, they become
associated with the same labor turnover costs as the insiders, and have an opportu-
nity to renegotiate their wage. (4) Employment decisions are made unilaterally by the
firms.” We consider our theoretical approach as compatible, even complementary, with
an insider-outsider framework. Nonetheless, it has not been conceived to satisfy all the
requirements of such a view. In the end, the bargaining process described in this work
seeks to describe the functioning of several European labor markets and for this reason
it shares the main characteristics of insider-outsider models.
To sum up, in this paper we model the bargaining process between a trade union and
a representative firm as a dynamic macroeconomic labor market. The dynamic analysis
accounts for the frictional effects that hiring and firing decisions have on the firm and the
trade union. The steady state equilibrium in the model can be thought of as a medium-
run equilibrium,5 in the sense described in macroeconomics textbooks (e.g. Blanchard
2005). The short-run macroeconomic equilibrium, which would be driven by aggregate
demand forces, is not explicitly modeled. However, some short-run “information” is
still taken into consideration through the initial conditions in our state variable. The
long-run equilibrium would depend primarily on capital accumulation which is out of
the scope of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses and
introduces, in a non-formal way, the frictional effects that we claim play an important role
in the bargaining process; and locates them within the existing literature on collective
bargaining in the labor market. In the third section, the formal model is built. Section
4 analyzes the the baseline scenario with no FE, and two intermediate scenarios with
FE only, either for the union or for the firm. Section 5 solves the general Stackelberg
game with frictional effect for both players, and develops a sensitivity analysis of some
parameters which describe the FE. Conclusions are presented in the last section.
2 Frictional effects for the firms and the union
2.1 Frictional effects for the firm
The literature on dynamic labor demand has frequently considered symmetric adjust-
ment costs in hiring and firing.6 These adjustment costs are usually represented by a
strictly convex function, or sometimes simply by a piecewise linear function in hiring
and firing (see, for example, Nickell, 1987). This formulation does not distinguish be-
tween hiring and firing costs, although the empirical literature has frequently stressed
5We analyze the steady-state equilibria, although considering the capital stock as an exoge-
nous constant. Therefore, we will talk about medium-run equilibria, given that only employ-
ment adjusts, and not the capital stock.
6Despite the fact that one of the first representations was not symmetric (Holt et al. 1960),
this has been a usual assumption ever since Eisner and Strotz (1963).
4that these costs differ to a certain degree. It is generally admitted that hiring costs are
higher than firing costs in countries like the United States (see Hamermesh, 1996, for a
review of some studies), whereas the opposite is true for continental Europe (e.g. Abowd
and Kramarz, 2003, and Goux et al., 2001, for French data).
For this reason, some authors departed from the assumption of symmetric quadratic
adjustment costs in the late 80s and early 90s, introducing asymmetries (an excellent
survey on this literature is Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Within the category of con-
vex costs, we can identify authors who still consider continuous differentiability (e.g.
Pfann and Palm, 1993) and those who consider a discontinuity in their adjustment cost
function (e.g. Chang and Stefanou, 1988, and Jaramillo et al., 1993). Alternatively, an-
other convenient specification for the adjustment costs is a continuous piecewise linear
function, although not continuously differentiable (see the seminal works by Bentolila
and Bertola 1990, Bertola 1990, Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1994, and Bertola and Roger-
son 1997), which treats hiring and firing costs differently. Finally, some authors have
addressed the existence of lump-sum costs, such as those that arise in the search for cer-
tain categories of personnel (hiring); or the administrative costs of collective dismissals
in many European countries (firing). These costs are independent, to a certain extent, of
the number of employees hired or laid off. These fixed costs explain why, under certain
circumstances, firms have an interest in hiring and firing in groups. Two representa-
tive works of this strand of literature are Hamermesh (1995) and Abowd and Kramarz
(2003).
We align ourselves with those who consider asymmetric and continuously differen-
tiable FE for the firm. Specifically, we focus on the case in which firing costs are more
important than hiring costs. This is typically the case in continental Europe and partic-
ularly in Southern Europe.7 Although hiring is associated with costs like recruiting and
training, we claim that it also represents an opportunity for wage savings, if we further
assume wage discrimination is in favor of incumbent employees and against newcomers.
Incumbent employees are insiders, while newly-hired workers, who were outsiders in the
instant immediately before (whom the union is less concerned about) receive a lower
wage while they become insiders. The existence of this wage savings for the firm can
be additionally explained based on the existence of a payroll tax subsidy to newly-hired
employees (which is a common economic policy in the European countries. Thus, the
net effect of hiring on the firm’s accounts would depend on the relative size of these
two opposing FE. To take in this asymmetry, the FE of hiring and firing are defined
7Cahuc et al. (2014, p.120) stated that: “(...) in countries where strong legal measures
are in place to enhance job security, the costs of separation outstrip recruitment costs”. A
well documented example of this empirical regularity is France (Abowd and Kramarz, 2003,
and Goux et al., 2001). Nonetheless, it is also well-known that not only France but the rest of
Southern European countries score high in the employment protection legislation (EPL) index.
In order to illustrate this point, Table 10.1 in Boeri and van Ours (2013, p. 278) shows how
France (3.0), Greece (3.0), Portugal (3.2), Italy (2.6), and Spain (3.1) exhibit extremely high
levels in the overall EPL index. In contrast, English-speaking countries like Australia (1.4),
Canada (1.0), Ireland (1.4), New Zealand (1.2), the United Kingdom (1.1), and the United
States (0.9) tend to show the lowest levels for the overall EPL index.
5in two parts. A first component, exclusively dependent on the number of hired or fired
employees, collects the standard assumption of symmetric convex costs. A second part
is explicitly dependent on the wage rate. We assume a positive relationship between
firing costs and wages, because severance payments typically amount to a number of
weeks of wage for every year that the employee has remained within the company. On
the other hand, the negative effect of wages on hiring costs reflects the stylized fact in
many countries that newcomers are initially paid only a fraction of the wage obtained by
current employees and, in consequence, the greater the wage rate, the greater the wage
savings from hiring. Thus, taking into account this wage-dependent second component,
a higher wage rate increases firing costs, but conversely reduces hiring costs, rendering
FE asymmetric. In fact, for small recruitment numbers, hiring represents a net benefit
for the firm.
Finally, we hypothesize that countries with higher firing costs (in weeks of wages) also
show a wider salary gap. This assumption is made for tractability, although it is not far
from the reality shown by empirical data. Dias da Silva and Turrini (2015) point out that
there is a direct relationship between the level of firing costs (measured through various
dimensions of the EPL) and the permanent-temporary wage gap across countries. The
theoretical reason for that relies on the different bargaining power of workers with an
open-ended contract versus those with a fixed-term contract. In other words, a stronger
employment protection for the permanent workers allows them, at the same time, to
obtain a higher wage differential with respect to their temporary counterparts. These
authors also show some empirical evidence supporting the previous statement. If we
consider that the newcomers are typically hired with a fixed-term contract, the previous
argument and the empirical evidence attached to it give credit to our way of modeling
this stylized fact.
2.2 Frictional effects for the union
According to previous research, the dynamic modelisation of collective bargaining can be
undertaken through three channels. One obvious way is through capital accumulation
as, for example, in the seminal work by van der Ploeg (1987) and in Palokangas (1992,
1997). These models are especially adequate for analyzing long-run questions. A more
recent example of this kind of literature on the long-run effects of collective bargaining
is Chang et al. (2007), who put the emphasis on a political trade union and the conflict
between the preferences of the leaders and the members. Nevertheless, as pointed out,
long-run equilibria are not the aim of this paper.
A second option to dynamize the collective bargaining process is to focus on the labor
input instead of the capital input. The cost (or the benefits if there exist) associated with
employment adjustment will prevent immediate or instantaneous adjustment, inducing
a dynamic behavior to maximizing firms. Thus, introducing frictional effects like those
described in the previous section into the bargaining process will also yield dynamic
effects. This approach is undertaken by Lockwood and Manning (1989), who analyze,
in a discrete setting, a dynamic model that takes into account quadratic adjustment
costs for the firm. They consider the right-to-manage theoretical framework in which
6the wage is jointly settled by the firm and the trade union (according to their bargaining
power), and then the firm unilaterally determines employment. They conclude that
the speed of adjustment is increased with respect to the competitive equilibrium case.
An alternative approach, in Modesto and Tomas (2001), is based on the monopoly
union model in which the firm chooses the optimal employment level, and the union
determines the optimal wage rate, knowing the labor demand fixed by the firm. The
non-cooperative equilibrium is confronted with the equilibrium under the cooperative or
dynamically efficient bargaining model. The monopoly union model is also analyzed in
Palokangas (1992, 1997), who considers a Stackelberg differential game with the union
acting as the leader.8
A third way of introducing a dynamic perspective into the collective bargaining
process is by assuming that FE also directly affect the union’s welfare. The dynamic
behavior of the trade union in collective bargaining has been analyzed by the literature
on union membership. Two influential papers in this literature, Kidd and Oswald (1987)
and Jones (1987), consider endogenous membership and analyze a monopolistic trade
union that cares about current and future members. Hiring decisions of the firm have
an effect on the union, since we are assuming that the union is concerned about all
employees (or alternatively, under the assumption that new recruitment immediately
joins the union). Correspondingly, the layoff of current employees induces welfare losses
to the union.9
The analysis of union membership is relevant for a closed-shop union system of
industrial relations. That could be the case for some countries, particularly in the Anglo-
Saxon System,10 but not all. We deviate from the the literature on union membership
and consider an open-shop system of industrial relations in which the union negotiates
on behalf of all employees (members or not members). The union focuses mainly on
incumbent employees or insider privileged employees, while outsider workers will face
less favorable employment conditions in the case of being hired, in particular, the wage
discrimination mentioned already.
Frictional effects for the trade union are of different nature when new workers are
hired or current employees are fired. We assume that firings reduce the union’s welfare
at an increasing rate. This assumption seems to be uncontroversial just by looking at
the way unions operate in the real world, posing a strong opposition if the firm fires a
large number of workers in one go, but much less so when firings occur gradually and
8Both, the right-to-manage model and the monopoly union model are studied in Koba
(2003), who analyzes the effect of deregulation on employment and wages.
9Some interesting works in this strand of research are Chang and Lai (1997) and, more re-
cently, Dittrich and Schirwitz (2011a), Dittrich and Schirwitz (2011b), or Kazanas and Miaouli
(2014).
10The union membership models usually capture some stylized facts of the industrial relations
systems of English-speaking countries. As already pointed out, in France and Spain practically
all workers are covered under a collective bargaining agreement, independently of whether they
are union members or not. Moreover, in Nordic countries (and more generally in those countries
under the Ghent system) the incentives to become a union member are rather different from
those described in the canonical union membership model.
7are restricted to few employees. Correspondingly, the union welcomes the recruitment
of new employees. Nonetheless, taking into account organizational aspects, the arrival
of new employees might give rise to a growing number of problems in the organization
of the union (i.e. an excessive inflow of workers could cause managerial problems in the
union). In consequence, we will assume that the union values the recruitment of new
employees positively, but at a decreasing rate.11
From this specification, one can conclude that the trade union is mainly concerned
about current employed workers (insiders), whose dismissal would reduce the union’s
welfare. Moreover, given the FE, the union is also partially worried about current
unemployed workers (outsiders) as they would be welcomed if hired.
3 The two actors in the collective bargaining process
Collective bargaining in a monopoly union model involves two agents: a firm, which
acts as the follower, and a monopolistic trade union, which takes the role of the leader.
The former has to determine the recruitment of new employees (or the layoff of current
employees) at each instant. The latter determines the wage rate although, given its
monopolistic role, it determines wages optimally, knowing the firm’s demand for new
employees.
Employment, L(t), is not considered as a decision variable but as a stock variable.
Therefore, the level of employment at time t, can be defined as the initial stock of
workers within the firm, L0, plus the accumulated flow of employees recruited, and not
fired, and minus the accumulated flow of employees who voluntarily quit the firm from
the start-up to the current time:
L(t) = L0 +
∫ t
0
h(τ)dτ −
∫ t
0
δL(τ)dτ, L0 ≥ 0,
with δ > 0 the rate of voluntary quit, assumed constant for tractability. The flow vari-
able, h(t), can be positive, implying new recruitment, or negative, representing firings.
Meanwhile, employment should not take a negative value, L(t) ≥ 0. The evolution of
employment can be alternatively defined by the differential equation:
(1) L˙(t) = h(t)− δL(t), L(0) = L0 ≥ 0.
According to this specification, the firm optimally adjusts the level of employment, which
is not the consequence of the attrition between actual and desired employment, as, for
example, in Guerrazzi (2011).12
11A simple example may help to clarify these asymmetric FE. We claim that firing some
current employees and replacing them with the same number of newcomers does not leave
the union’s welfare unaltered. The improvement in welfare associated with the arrival of new
employees is more than offset by the strong decrease in the union’s welfare from their dismissal.
12This work includes additional dynamics governing the marginal productivity of labor.
83.1 The employer
The main interest of the paper is to analyze to what extent the adjustment effects or
frictions in the labor market can affect the employment level and the wage rate at the
equilibrium, and the speed of convergence towards this equilibrium. The installed cap-
ital stock is taken as a given constant, and our analysis corresponds to a medium-run
equilibrium. Since we assume a fixed amount of capital, production can be made depen-
dent on only the total amount of labor Y (L(t)), characterized by a labor productivity
which decreases in the employment level. For tractability, the specification considered
here is a linear quadratic function in the level of employment, L(t):
(2) Y (L(t)) = aL(t)− L
2(t)
2
,
with a > 0 the highest possible labor productivity (attained for L(t) = 0). This param-
eter collects, among other factors, the installed capital stock and the level of technology,
both assumed to be time-invariant.
Under the unit price hypothesis the profits of the firm are defined as total output
minus the wage bill paid to employees, Y (L(t))−w(t)L(t), with w(t) the identical wage
rate for all employees regardless of their seniority. Firm’s finances are also affected by the
frictions from the hiring or firing of employees. Hence, the firm cannot bring forth the
desired employment level instantaneously and at no cost, but must develop it gradually.
When recruiting new employees, the adjustment costs traditionally encompass the cost in
the act of hiring (advertising and interviewing process) plus the expenses of incorporating
new employees into the productive activity (training). The literature often assumes
convex hiring costs.13 Likewise, firing costs are also usually assumed to be increasing
at the margin. The literature usually assumes strictly convex adjustment costs, and
also symmetric hiring and firing cost functions, that is, AC(h), with AC ′(h) > 0 if
h > 0, AC ′(h) < 0 if h < 0, AC ′′(h) ≥ 0 and AC(h) = AC(−h). We consider that the
adjustment costs are not only dependent on the number of employees being hired/fired,
but also on the wage they receive. For fired employees, labor legislation in many countries
includes a severance package, defined as a percentage (usually dependent on the number
of years in work) of the wage earned by the incumbent worker. To the best of our
knowledge, the relationship between FE and wages has not been addressed previously
by the literature on dynamic collective bargaining. Thus, we define a twofold FE for
the firm when hiring, composed of: the standard convex adjustment costs, exclusively
dependent on the number of fired workers, plus a wage-dependent term, defined as a
percentage, β,of the current wage times the number of employees being fired:
CF(firing(t)) = AC(firing(t)) + β · w(t) · firing(t).
To analyze how the wage rate may affect hiring costs, and following the terminology in
the insider-outsider theory of employment, we distinguish between incumbent employees
13This standard assumption is not exempt from criticism. Nickell (1987) states that for low
levels of hiring it is hard to think of good reasons why hiring costs should be increasing at the
margin.
9and newly-hired employees, the latter with less favorable working conditions, reflected
in a lower wage. This wage discrimination is exclusively based on institutional grounds.
We do not include in the model differences in labor productivity associated with the
level of expertise within the firm. Nor do we base the salary gap on the existence of
hiring costs which disincentive labor turnover. We just assume that the union is less
concerned about newly-hired employees, who were outsiders immediately before, and
hence accepts that they receive a lower salary, wn < w. Thus, the wage bill for the
firm is directly dependent on the number of employees hired at each instant of time:
w(t)L(t)− (w(t)−wn(t)) · hiring(t). In consequence, hiring implies a direct cost for the
firm, represented by the standard convex adjustment costs, but also wage savings, due
to the wage discrimination against newcomers. So, the frictional effect of hiring for the
firm can be defined as
CF(hiring(t)) = AC(hiring(t))− (w(t)− wn(t)) · hiring(t).
For simplicity, we assume that the wage gap remains constant over time in relative
terms, i.e. (w(t)−wn(t))/w(t) is constant. Moreover, we also make the assumption that
this constant is equal to β.14 Thus, β is given a double interpretation, implying that a
higher wage raises the marginal cost of firing by the same amount as it decreases the
marginal cost of hiring (due to higher wage savings). This assumption has been made for
tractability; however, we argue that it is not excessively far from the reality. As suggested
by Dias da Silva and Turrini (2015), there seems to be an empirical correlation between
firing costs and wage inequality. Under this assumption, it is possible to merge the two
basic ideas of firing costs marginally increasing with wages and hiring costs marginally
decreasing with wages, in a unique function to describe the FE. When the firm hires
employees15 (h > 0), the wage bill can be split in two parts, distinguishing between
senior employees, w(L − h), and newcomers, wnh. And from the definition of β as the
wage gap, the wage bill can be written as wL−βwh. The last term represents the wage
savings (a profit) from hiring newcomers and must be subtracted from the quadratic
standard adjustment costs AC(h) to constitute what we denote as the frictional effect.
When the firm fires current workers (h < 0), since there are no newcomers, the wage
bill is simply wL. However, the frictional effect of firing presents two components: the
standard quadratic costs, AC(h), plus the term which relates firing costs and wages
rates, βw(−h). Then, assuming a quadratic specification for the standard convex costs,
AC(h), the FE of hiring and firing can be jointly represented by
(3) CF(h,w) = c
h2
2
− βwh, c, β > 0.
Notice, however, that this function does not imply symmetric hiring and firing costs,
unless β = 0. As Figure 1 shows, when the firm fires workers, the standard adjustment
costs are increased by the term which collects the effect of wages on firing costs. By
14Since it has been assumed that the wage paid to newcomers is strictly lower than the wage
paid to current employees, then it must hold that β ∈ (0, 1).
15Here and henceforth we omit the time argument when no confusion arises.
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Figure 1
Frictional effects for the firm
contrast, when the firm hires new employees adjustment costs are reduced because of
the wage savings. In fact, a firm which hires workers enjoys net gains if the number
of new recruitments is not too large. For hiring rates below the upper bound, 2βw/c,
wage savings from newcomers more than offset hiring costs. It is worth noticing that
at the steady-state equilibrium the firm hires exactly the fraction of employees that
quits voluntarily. Because at the medium-run the firm hires new employees, from the
double interpretation of β, what matters at the equilibrium is its role as a measure of the
wage discrimination or wage gap between incumbent employees and newcomers. The
interpretation of β as the part of the firing costs linked with wages may be relevant
for short-term adjustment, if the initial situation is one of an excessively large level
of employment and the firm has to fire some workers within a first period. But this
interpretation is only valid temporally because, even in that situation, firings will stop
at some point and, as the medium-run level of employment is approached, the firm starts
hiring to replace the voluntary quit.
The profits of the firm are defined by the income from production, Y (L), minus the
wage bill. Moreover, it is also assumed that the FE associated with hiring and firing
may increase or reduce income. Thus, a firm’s profits can be written as
WF(h,w, L) = Y (L)− wL− CF(h,w),
with the production function given in (2) and the FE of hiring and firing in (3).
3.2 The trade union
This subsection analyzes the existence of FE of hiring and firing on the union’s welfare
within a monopoly union model. We depart from the standard dynamic model of union
membership as presented in Jones (1987) and Kidd and Oswald (1987). By considering
an open-shop system of industrial relations, the union represents all employees and not
merely the union members. In particular, it is concerned about the insider incumbent
11
employees already working in the firm. Taking into account an expected utility approach,
the instantaneous union’s utility reads: WU(w,L) =
(
L
N
)
u(w) +
(
1− L
N
)
u(B), or by
normalizing total population, N , to one,16 WU(w,L) = Lu(w) + (1− L)u(B), with B
the unemployment benefit, and u(·) a concave utility function.
Within this framework we introduce two additional assumptions, so giving entrance
to the FE of hiring and firing on the trade union. The union is concerned about the
excess utility, u(w)− u(B), that the L current employees enjoy, associated with a wage,
w, above the unemployment benefit, B, as well as the utility of unemployed workers.
When a specific worker is fired, assuming the wage of all remaining employees remains
unchanged, the union acknowledges a decrease in utility associated with the decrease
in this worker’s income (the opposite is true when an unemployed worker is hired).
Additionally, we support the hypothesis that the union resents firings, more than the
mere utility losses from a lower income. These welfare losses for the union, henceforth
denoted firing costs (likewise as for the firm) can be based, for example, on the discontent
among employees whose fellow workers are being fired, on the insecurity about their
future within the firm, or the rise in their workload. We assume that the cost of firing
is increasing at the margin. Correspondingly, the union welcomes the incorporation of
new recruitment more than these workers’ expected utility gains. In contrast to the
firing costs, the marginal gain from hiring new employees decays with the number of
newcomers. One possible explanation for this assumption is the organizational problems
that the arrival of new employees may bring to either the firm or the union.
The hypotheses of increasing marginal costs from firing and decreasing marginal
gains from hiring can both be encompassed by a single function describing the FE of
hiring and firing for the union: CU(h) = dh(h − H)/2, with d > 0 a measure of the
size or relative importance of the FE with respect to the utilitarian part of the union’s
welfare. Parameter H > 0 is the recruitment level at which hiring stops being attractive
for the union. More interestingly, H/2 is the recruitment level at which an additional
employee starts not to be welcome by the union (i.e. represents a marginal disutility).
The functions describing the FE and their marginal variations with h are depicted in
Figure 2.
Finally, assuming a one-to-one utility function, the objective function for the union
with FE would read
WU(h,w, L) = Lw + (1− L)B − CU(h).
4 Collective bargaining and frictional effects
To better understand the role of the adjustment costs linked to firing, and the adjustment
gains that the firm and the union attach to hiring, this section characterizes the labor
market equilibrium in successive stages. In the first stage we obtain the wage and the
16With a constant population equal to one, the expected utility approach is equivalent to
considering a utilitarian union see, for example, Booth (1995).
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Frictional effects for the union
employment level when neither firm’s profits nor union’s welfare is influenced by hiring or
firing decisions. This would be the equilibrium in a simple static monopoly union model.
In a second step, we introduce the frictional effects for only one of the players, the firm
or the union. In either case the model becomes dynamic and employment progressively
adapts to its steady-state value. By comparing the steady-state equilibrium for these
models against the equilibrium with no FE, it is possible to follow the trail of how the
wage and the level of employment are affected by the frictions faced by either the firm
or the union. In the last stage, the next subsection analyzes the differential game when
both firm and union are affected by the frictions from hiring and firing.
4.1 A game with no FE
With no adjustment costs, the firm can instantaneously adapt the current level of em-
ployment to its desired level. It would fix the optimal level of employment at which
wages and labor productivity equate, Y ′(L) = w, which defines the static labor demand,
L = a− w. The monopolistic union, knowing this labor demand function, would settle
the wage which maximizes WU(0, w, a − w) = (a − w)(w − B) + B. The wage and the
employment level at this static equilibrium are17
(4) ws =
a+B
2
, Ls =
a−B
2
The wage, ws, can be understood as a convex combination (the mean value) between the
maximum labor productivity, a, and the unemployment benefit, B. That is, between
the maximum and the minimum possible competitive wages. The employment level at
the equilibrium, Ls, depends on the gap between these two wages. And likewise, it
17Superscript s refers to the static scenario or equivalently, the scenario without FE.
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is a convex combination between the zero demand at the maximum wage, a, and the
maximum demand, a−B, that would occur at the lower possible wage, or unemployment
benefit, B. Since we have normalized total population to one, the equilibrium is feasible
under condition a ∈ [B, 2 +B], assumed henceforth. In this static setting, the outcome
is that a higher labor productivity, a, would increase wages and employment, while a
more generous unemployment benefit would raise wages and reduce employment.
4.2 A game with FE only for the union
Facing no frictional effects, the firm would determine the level of employment by again
equating the marginal productivity of labor to wages, hence setting the labor demand
function L = a − w. By contrast, in this subsection firing costs and hiring gains come
into the union’s welfare. Given this demand function, it is clear for a monopoly union
that changes in wages will be transformed into opposite changes in employment levels:
w˙ = −L˙. This equation, together with the dynamics of the employment level in (1),
allows us to define the dynamic problem for the monopoly union considering the wage
as a state variable and replacing the level of employment by the known labor demand
function:
max
h
∫ ∞
0
[
w(a− w) + (1− a+ w)B − dhh−H
2
]
e−ρtdt,
s.t.: w˙ = δa− h− δw, w(0) = a− L0.
It seems more natural to define a trade union that, rather than taking hiring or firing
decisions, chooses the change in the wage rate, u, (positive or negative) at any time,
t. Thus, taking into account that h = δ(a − w) − w˙, the previous problem can be
equivalently written as
max
u
∫ ∞
0
[
w(a− w) + (1− a+ w)B − d[δ(a− w)− u]δ(a− w)− u−H
2
]
e−ρtdt,
s.t.: w˙ = u.
This optimal control problem has a unique solution which converges towards the steady-
state solution:18
(5) w¯AU =
a+B + d(ρ+ δ)
[
aδ − H
2
]
2 + dδ(ρ+ δ)
, L¯AU =
a−B + d(ρ+ δ)H
2
2 + dδ(ρ+ δ)
, h¯AU = δL¯AU,
at the speed
φAU =
1
2
{
ρ−
√
(ρ+ 2δ)2 +
8
d
}
< 0.
By comparing this steady-state with the equilibrium in the scenario with no frictions,
we observe that L¯AU > Ls, and equivalently w¯AU < ws, if and only if hs < H/2, where
18Superscript AU refers to the scenario with adjustment or frictional effects only for the
union.
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hs = δLs denotes the hiring required to replace the voluntary quit in the equilibrium with
no FE. To understand this condition, note that according to function CU(h), while firing
increasingly damages union’s welfare, hiring represents a marginal increment in union’s
welfare only below H/2. Marginal increments in hiring above this level will reduce
the union’s welfare. Condition hs < H/2 states that the number of employees that
voluntarily quit if employment is at its static level (or equilibrium level with no FE), is
lower than the value, H/2, which minimizes adjustment costs, i.e. maximizes the union’s
benefits from new recruitments. In consequence, if starting at the static employment
level, Ls, the firm hired workers above those required to replace the voluntary quit, the
union’s welfare would be enhanced. This gives the union an incentive to fix a wage
below the static wage in order to induce the firm to increase hirings. The steady-state
equilibrium would be characterized by a higher employment level and therefore a greater
number of workers who voluntarily quit and who are replaced by the firm, causing a rise
in the union’s welfare. Applying the opposite reasoning, if hs > H/2 additional hirings
damage union’s welfare and in consequence, the union would fix a higher wage seeking
to reduce employment. This can be summarized as
(6) L¯AU R Ls ⇔ w¯AU Q ws ⇔ hs ≡ δa−B
2
Q H
2
.
From expression (6) it becomes immediately clear that the existence of FE for the union
does not necessarily lead to greater wages and unemployment rates. This would be the
case only if the size of these FE as measured by H/2, is small enough in comparison
with the voluntary quit with no FE.19 Therefore, a monopoly union that welcomed the
entrance of new employees to the firm might fix a lower wage, so inducing a higher
level of employment than a union only concerned about excess utility if i) the range of
newly hired employees that raises union’s welfare, H, is large; ii) the salary gap between
the maximum feasible wage and the unemployment benefit, a − B, is small; or iii) the
rate of voluntary quit is low. Conversely, if these conditions are not met, wages and
unemployment would be higher.
4.3 A game with FE only for the firm
In a monopoly union model, if the firm, which acts as the follower, faces frictional effects,
it would fix the hiring level in order to solve the dynamic problem:
max
h
∫ ∞
0
[Y (L)− wL− CF(h,w)] e−ρtdt,(7)
s.t.: L˙ = h− δL, L(0) = L0 ≥ 0.(8)
Given the linear-quadratic structure of the optimization problem, a linear-quadratic
value function is conjectured20 V AFF (L) = a
AF
F L
2/2 + bAFF L + c
AF
F , with a
AF
F , b
AF
F and c
AF
F
19That is, if the range of h compatible with marginal gains from hirings, H/2, is small in
comparison with the gap between the maximum possible wage and the unemployment benefit
scaled by the rate of voluntary quit.
20Superscript AF refers to the scenario with FE only for the firm.
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the unknowns to be determined. The firm would fix recruitment up to the point when
the marginal frictional effect of an additional employee being hired or fired equates the
marginal value of this additional employee for the firm, (V AFF )
′(L). This optimality condi-
tion determines a hiring/firing function dependent on the wage rate and the employment
level:
(9) hˆAF(w,L) =
wβ + (V AFF )
′(L)
c
.
Notice that the marginal frictional effect when hiring is composed of the standard
marginal adjustment costs, ch, plus the marginal benefits from the wage discount to
newcomers, defined as a fraction, β, of the incumbents’ wage, w. The greater the wage
rate, the greater the wage savings from hiring new employees, and therefore the stronger
the firm’s incentive to hire, which explains the positive direct effect of wages on hirings.
The trade union acts as the leader and knows the reaction function of the firm in (9).
It must determine wages in order to maximize its stream of discounted welfare, which
assuming no FE would read
max
w
∫ ∞
0
[wL+ (1− L)B] e−ρtdt,(10)
s.t.: L˙ = hˆAF(w,L)− δL, L(0) = L0 ≥ 0.(11)
This linear optimization problem leads to a bang-bang solution for the union of the form
(12) wAF(L) =

wmax ≡ a if L+ β
c
(V AFU )
′(L) > 0,
wmin ≡ B if L+ β
c
(V AFU )
′(L) < 0.
We consider here that the minimum possible wage fixed by the union is given by the
unemployment benefit, B, and the maximum wage by the maximum productivity of
labor, a. Because the union faces a linear problem we guess a linear value function,
V AFU (L) = b
AF
U L + c
AF
U . Thus, the marginal value that the union assigns to employment,
(V AFU )
′(L) = bAFU , is constant and independent of the actual level of employment, L.
Here we study the case in which the union fixes either the minimum wage, B, or the
maximum wage, a, for the whole time period, since this allows us to obtain analytical
results, which give us the intuition to explain the comparison with the case with no
FE.21 For brevity, we denote the constant wage as w¯ (which may refer to either B or a).
Under the assumption that no switches take place, the game can be easily solved, with22
(13) aAFF =
c(ρ+ 2δ)−√∆AF
2
< 0, ∆AF = c2(ρ+ 2δ)2 + 4c.
21From (12), this assumption is equivalent to assuming a monotonously increasing employ-
ment starting from an initial level above −βbAFU /c, or a decreasing employment starting from
an initial level below −βbAFU /c. In fact, we will show that the former is always true and that
wAF(L) = wmax for any t ≥ 0.
22The highly cumbersome expressions for cAFF (w¯) and c
AF
U (w¯) are not relevant and, hence,
are not presented here. They are available from the authors on request.
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(14) bAFF (w¯) =
c(a− w¯) + βaAFF w¯
c(ρ+ δ)− aAFF
, bAFU (w¯) =
c(w¯ −B)
c(ρ+ δ)− aAFF
> 0.
From (8), (9) and the expression of aAFF the employment at the steady-state reads
(15) L¯AF(w¯) =
a− [1− β(ρ+ δ)]w¯
1 + cδ(ρ+ δ)
And the convergence towards this steady-state value is given by
φAF =
1
2
{
ρ−
√
(ρ+ 2δ)2 +
4
c
}
< 0.
Under the assumption of a constant wage, the present value of the ongoing wages paid
to an additional worker hired today (who is not fired) and who can voluntarily quit at a
rate δ, is given by w¯/(ρ+ δ). Correspondingly, the instantaneous benefit from the hiring
of this additional worker is given by the savings from his/her lower wage, βw¯. From now
on, we assume that current savings from hiring does not exceed the ongoing wage costs
(otherwise it would be beneficial to hire unproductive workers), as is stated in the next
condition.
Condition 1
(16) β <
1
ρ+ δ
⇔ 1− β(ρ+ δ) > 0.
This Condition 1 is immediately obvious under the plausible assumption that the
discount rate plus the rate of voluntary quit, ρ+ δ, does not surpass one, and provided
that β ∈ (0, 1).
For the firm to be viable, the present value of the marginal productivity of labor
when this is highest (in the case of a single worker), a/(ρ+ δ), must exceed the present
value of the wage cost of this single worker net of the initial wage discount when hired,
w¯/(ρ+δ)−βw¯. However, this condition is always satisfied, since a ≥ w¯ ≥ w¯(1−β(ρ+δ)).
In consequence, a positive employment, L¯AF(w¯), in the medium-run is guaranteed.
As shown in (15), the employment in the medium-run depends on the wage charged
by the monopoly union. To determine this wage, the union, acting as the leader, is aware
of the positive link between wages and the recruitment policy settled by the firm. Thus,
it acknowledges that a marginal increment in wages increases wage earnings, while at
the same time induces the firm to enhance hirings at a rate β/c. Given that the marginal
value of an additional employee for the union, (V AFU )
′(L) = bAFU (w¯) is non-negative for
any w¯ ≥ B, then from equation (12) it follows that wAF(L) = a, ∀t ≥ 0 is the optimal
solution.23 By contrast, with no FE for firm or union, higher wages lead the firm
to reduce employment, and consequently the marginal gains for the union, reaching an
23This is true as long as L remains nonnegative, which is obvious from (8) and (9).
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optimal value at ws = (a+B)/2. Thus, the existence of adjustment costs for the firm lead
the union to fix a higher wage than in the case without FE, wAF = a > ws = (a+B)/2.
At this wage, from equation (9), the dynamics in (11) and the expressions for the
coefficients of the value functions, it follows that the employment level converges towards
its steady-state value:
(17) L¯AF(a) =
βa(ρ+ δ)
1 + cδ(ρ+ δ)
> 0.
Although wages are higher than in the case with no FE, this does not necessarily
lead to lower employment levels. Next, we compare employment levels with and without
FE for the firm.
Lemma 2 If the wage rate with FE for the firm was given by its level in the case with
no FE, wAF = ws, then L¯AF(ws) > Ls if and only if:
(18) (a−B)δc < (a+B)β.
Or equivalently, denoting by h˜(w¯) = βw¯/c the recruitment which maximizes the benefits
from wage savings at wage w¯, then L¯AF(ws) > Ls if and only if:24
(19) hs ≡ δLs < h˜(ws).
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. If the hirings with no FE are
lower than the value which maximizes wage savings, then the existence of FE for the firm
gives it an incentive to increase hirings. In consequence, employment in the medium run
would be higher than in the case with no FE, because then more employees would quit
voluntarily, and correspondingly more workers would be hired at the steady state, so
increasing the wage savings for the firm. The opposite reasoning applies if hs > h˜(ws).
Therefore, if the wage when the FE for the firm are included remained unchanged,
the employment could be enhanced or reduced depending on whether condition (19)
is fulfilled or not. However, the existence of FE for the firm does not leave the wage
unchanged. It leads the union to fix a wage rate wAF = a greater than ws.
With FE for the firm, a higher wage rate has a double effect on hirings as collected
in expression (9). It has a direct positive effect because a higher wage represents higher
wage savings. Moreover, it has an indirect negative effect because a higher wage also
represents a lower marginal valuation of employment by the employer. From (9) and
(14) it is not hard to prove25 that the latter, indirect, effect is stronger and hence that
the net effect is negative under Condition 1:
∂hˆ(w,L)
∂w
=
β
c
+
(bAFF )
′(w)
c
= − 1− β(ρ+ δ)
c(ρ+ δ)− aAFF
< 0.
24Recall that hs ≡ δLs is the hiring required to replace the voluntary quit in the equilibrium
with no FE.
25This negative relationship is also clear from the expression of L¯AF(w¯) in (15).
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Condition (19) assumes a recruitment in the scenario with no-FE lower than the value
which maximizes wage savings from hirings. In these circumstances, the existence of FE
for the firm would lead to higher employment if the wage were the same as without FE,
L¯AF(ws) > Ls. However, FE also lead the union to raise the wage rate, which reduces
hirings (and employment at the steady state), L¯AF(a) < L¯AF(ws). In consequence, the
comparison between L¯AF(a) and Ls is unclear. Conversely, if condition (19) is reversed,
hirings in the case of no FE are too high. Thus, with no change in wages there would
be an incentive to reduce employment. Further, since the wage rises, this incentive is
enhanced. In consequence, in this case the existence of FE for the firm would lead to a
smaller level of employment, L¯AF(a) < Ls.
To have a better insight into the effect of the FE on the equilibrium level of employ-
ment, in what follows we focus on parameter c, which defines the relative importance of
the standard adjustment cost for the firm, and on parameter β, which represents both
the effect of wages on the firing costs and, more importantly, the wage savings from new
recruitments. Here and henceforth, we assume that ρ + δ < 1, and hence Condition
1 is satisfied for all β ∈ (0, 1). Depending on these parameters’ values it is possible
to characterize the regions at which the existence of FE for the firm implies a greater
(L¯AF(a) > Ls) or a lower (L¯AF(a) < Ls) employment in the medium-term.
Proposition 3 Assuming β ∈ (0, 1), and c > 0, the steady-state level of employment
with FE for the firm is greater/equal/lower than the employment with no FE, L¯AF(a) R
Ls, when parameters take values within regions:
L¯AF(a) > Ls ⇔ Ω = {(β, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0,∞)|β > φ(c)} ,(20)
L¯AF(a) = Ls ⇔ Ω0 = {(β, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0,∞)|β = φ(c)} ,(21)
L¯AF(a) < Ls ⇔ Ωc = {(β, c) ∈ (0, 1)× (0,∞)|β < φ(c)} .(22)
with φ(c) = φ0 + φ1c =
a−B
2a
+
(a−B)(ρ+ δ)δ
2a
c.
Regions Ω, Ω0 and Ωc are depicted in Figure 3 under the already mentioned assump-
tion of ρ + δ < 1. This figure shows that the FE for the firm will increase employment
only if the wage saving from new recruitment, β, is sufficiently large. And this result
becomes more unlikely the greater the standard part of the adjustment costs, c. In fact,
for26 c > c˜ or for β < φ0, it holds that L¯
AF(a) is always lower than Ls. Thus, the
higher the standard quadratic adjustment costs, the more likely it is that the frictional
effects will reduce employment. And, conversely, the stronger the wage discrimination
to newcomers the more likely it is that FE for the firm increase labor.
A necessary condition for a non-empty set Ω is φ0 < 1, or equivalently,
(23) a−B < 2a(ρ+ δ) ⇔ B > a(1− 2(ρ+ δ)).
which requires a wage gap between employed and unemployed workers, that is not
excessively wide. Under this condition, the area in region Ω can be interpreted as a
26Constant c˜ is the value of c which satisfies φ(c˜) = 1: c˜ = [B−a(1−2(ρ+δ))]/[(a−B)δ(ρ+δ)].
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Comparison L¯AF(a) vs. Ls
measure of the likelihood that the FE for the firm increase the level of employment.
This area reads
(24) Ω =
∫ c˜
0
1− φ(c)dc = [B − a(1− 2(ρ+ δ))]
2
4a(a−B)δ(ρ+ δ)2 .
From this expression and condition (23) it is easy to show that Ωa−B < 0 and Ωρ > 0.
Thus, the region at which FE for the firm increase employment shrinks with the wage
gap between employed and unemployed workers, a−B. Conversely, this region increases
with the degree of impatience, ρ. However, the effect of the rate of voluntary quit on
the size of Ω is unclear (Ωδ can be positive or negative).
5 A Stackelberg differential game
5.1 A game with FE for the firm and the union
This section takes into account the existence of firing costs for the firm while at the
same time considering that the flow of employees who unwillingly abandon the firm also
reduces the union’s welfare. In contrast, new recruitments enhance firm’s profits and
union’s welfare at a decreasing rate.
The monopoly union model assumes that the union fixes wages knowing the hir-
ing/firing decision taken by the firm. The solution concept considered in this dynamic
game is the stagewise feedback Stackelberg solution (as it is called in Bas¸ar and Olsder
(1982)). This type of solution considers a stagewise first-mover advantage for the trade
union, which has an instantaneous advantage at each time. Thus, at each time, the union
announces the wage to the firm, which then fixes recruitment. Knowing the recruitment
decision of the firm for every wage rate, the union determines the optimal wage. As is
usual in differential games with an infinite time horizon, we assume stationary strategies
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dependent on the level of employment within the firm but not explicitly on time (see,
for example, Dockner et al., 2000).
Thus, we characterize first the recruitment decision of the firm, which takes the role
of the follower, as dependent on the wage fixed by the union. For the firm’s optimization
problem (7)-(8) the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is
ρVF(L) = max
h
{
aL− L
2
2
− wL+ βwL− ch
2
2
+ VF(L)(h− δL)
}
.
From the first order conditions one gets:
V ′F(L) = ch− βw.
An additional hired employee represents a reduction in firing costs or an increment in
hiring gains when h < βw/c; but, conversely, it implies an increment in hiring costs
when h > βw/c. On the other hand, the marginal value of this additional employee for
the firm is given by V ′F(L). The firm hires workers up to the point when the two effects
balance. If the firm positively values employment, then it will hire a lot above the value
H/2 and the standard convex adjustment costs surpass wage savings at the margin. The
reverse is true if the firm negatively values employment. Thus, the reaction function for
the firm reads
(25) hˆ(w,L) =
wβ + (VF)
′(L)
c
,
which is identical to the case with FE only for the firm in (9). The only difference is the
coefficients of the quadratic value function, now defined as VF(L) = aFL
2/2 + bFL+ cF.
Knowing the recruitment policy of the firm, the monopolistic union determines the
wage rate in order to maximize:
max
w
∫ ∞
0
[
wL+ (1− L)B − dhˆ(w,L) hˆ(w,L)−H
2
]
e−ρtdt,
L˙ = hˆ(w,L)− δL, L(0) = L0.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this problem reads
ρVU(L) = max
w
{
wL+ (1− L)B − dhˆ(w,L) hˆ(w,L)−H
2
+ VU(L)(hˆ(w,L)− δL)
}
.
And from the optimality conditions for this problem it must hold:
(26) L =
∂hˆ(w,L)
∂w
[
C ′U(hˆ(w,L))− V ′U(L)
]
=
β
c
[
d
(
h− H
2
)
− aUL− bU
]
.
where VU(L) = aUL
2/2 + bUL + cU is the quadratic value function of the union. A
marginal increment in wages increases the wage gains of employees (at rate L). It
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also raises the the wage discount to newcomers and hence the firm’s incentive to hire,
∂hˆ(w,L)/∂w = β/c > 0. More hirings have a double effect on the union. On the one
hand, more hirings27 may increase hiring gains (C ′U(h) < 0 iff h < H/2), or they may
reduce them (C ′U(h) > 0 iff h > H/2). On the other hand, a marginal increment in
hirings implies a rise in employment, which the union values as V ′U(L). The optimal
wage balances the direct effect of higher wages on the rent earned by the collective of
employees and the indirect effect on the union’s welfare of more hirings associated with
higher wages. From the first order condition (26), and the reaction function for the firm
in (25) the feedback strategies for the union and the firm follow:
φw(L) = φ
0
w + φ
1
wL =
cbU − dbF
dβ
+
c
β
H
2
+
c(βaU + c)− dβaF
dβ2
L,(27)
φh(L) = φ
0
h + φ
1
hL =
bU
d
+
H
2
+
βaU + c
βd
L.(28)
Note that the optimal recruitment decision of the firm φh(L), paradoxically does not
depend on the marginal value of an additional employee for the firm V ′F(L). That is
because the union settles wages so as to oblige the firm to hire at the rate which balances
(26). If the marginal valuation of employment for the firm rises, V ′F(L), increasing the
firm’s willingness to hire (as shown in (25)), the union will correspondingly reduce wages
to lower the wage savings that the firm obtains from newcomers and hence to reduce the
incentive to hire for the firm. The two effects exactly cancels out and hiring and firing
decisions of the firm, which is a Stackelberg follower, depend only on the value function
of the Stackelberg leader trade union.
Plugging this optimal strategies into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations we ob-
tain a system of 6 Riccati equations in the unknowns aF, bF, cF, aU, bU, cU. Two sets of
solutions for the coefficients of the value functions are found analytically.28
Proposition 4 A solution for this system of Riccati equations with a concave value
function, VU(L), i.e. satisfying aU < 0, is found under Condition 1 and sufficient condi-
tion c ≤ d (assumed henceforth).
Proof See Appendix
Although no condition is found to characterize the sign of aF, the numerical simu-
lations29 carried out for different parameter values support the hypothesis of a positive
coefficient aF, or a concave value function for the firm.
27If hˆ(w,L) < 0, fewer firings will always represent lower firing costs.
28The solutions are obtained with the help of Mathematica. Due to their complexity, their
expressions are not useful and we do not present them here.
29We have computed the coefficients of the value functions for parameters’ values: c =
0.1, ρ = 0.05, δ = 0.15, d = 1, B = 0.1, H = 0.1, a = 0.77588, L0 = 0, β = 0.3. The result
is robust to 10 % up and down changes in each parameter’s value (L0 moving from 0 to 0.1),
keeping all other parameters constant.
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Proposition 5 Under Condition 1, and sufficient condition c ≤ d, φ′h(L) = φ1h < 0.
Furthermore, if aF > 0 (numerically shown) then φ
′
w(L) = φ
1
w < 0.
Proof See appendix.
To have a better intuition of the results presented in Proposition 4, notice that an
additional employee affects the optimal wage decision taken by the monopoly union in
three ways:
i) It directly increases the level of employment, and with it the marginal gains from
higher wages, hence increasing the union’s willingness to rise wages.
ii) Since aU < 0, a greater employment level reduces the union’s marginal valuation
of employment, V ′U(L) < 0. This makes the union less willing to accept a rise in
hirings, and pushes it to reduce wages in order to induce the firm to reduce hirings.
iii) Since (numerically) aF > 0, a greater employment level increases the firm’s marginal
valuation of employment, V ′F(L) > 0. Knowing the firm’s higher willingness to hire,
the union will be inclined to reduce wages in order to reduce the incentive to hire
for the firm with lower wage savings to newcomers.
Proposition 4 proves that the unique positive effect i) is weaker than the negative effect
ii).30 Therefore, the wage rate decays as the employment grows, φ′w(L) = φ
1
w < 0.
To give an interpretation to the effect of employment on the optimal hiring decisions
of the firm, recall that this decision is independent of the marginal value that the firm
gives to employment. This is equivalent to saying that the positive effect that a greater
employment has on the firm’s marginal value of employment and hence on its willingness
to hire, is exactly counterbalanced by a monopolistic trade union setting lower wages as
stated in effect iii). In consequence, employment reduces hirings through the reduction
in wages and the consequent decay in wage savings from the wage discount to newcomers,
exclusively explained by effects i) and ii).
Remark 6 Under Condition 1, and condition c ≤ d, from equation (1) it follows that
employment converges towards its steady-state value:
(29) L¯ = β
bU + d
H
2
βdδ − (βaU + c) .
And the speed of convergence is given by
(30) φ =
∣∣∣∣βaU + cdβ − δ
∣∣∣∣ .
If we assume an initial level of employment below its steady-state value, L0 < L¯, em-
ployment will increase steadily towards L¯ as displayed in Figure 4 (right), at the speed
30And obviously weaker than the addition of the two negative effects ii) and iii).
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Optimal time path for wages (left); hirings and employment (right)
φ in (30). Correspondingly, as employment grows, the wage settled by the union decays
towards a steady-state value greater than the unemployment benefit, B, as shown in
Figure 4 (left). Likewise, the firm will hire fewer and fewer employees, while the number
of employees who voluntarily quit the firm increases with the level of employment. As
Figure 4 (right) shows, the two quantities converge in the medium run, and so employ-
ment remains constant. An opposite behavior of decreasing employment and increasing
wages and recruitment rates would occur if the initial level of employment is above the
steady state, L0 > L¯.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
When FE are present for the firm as well as for the union, the influence on employment
and wages of the different parameters defining the labor market can be numerically
studied. The numerical analysis is carried out for the parameters’ values in footnote 29.
The results are presented in Table 1 which shows the effect of the main parameters on
the labor market as described by the steady-state values of employment and wages, as
well as the speed of adjustment (represented by the absolute value of φ). Results in this
section are robust to 10 % up and down changes in each parameter’s value (L0 moving
from 0 to 0.1), keeping all others parameters constant.
For parameter d, which defines the size of the FE for the union, it is found that the
stronger these FE, the less faster is the convergence towards the steady-state equilibrium,
characterized by a higher wage settled by the union and a lower level of employment.
Low employment levels and higher wages are also attained if the unemployment benefit,
B, is high, although this variable does not affect the speed of convergence. Finally, the
effect of wages on firing costs, which is considered identical to the parameter describing
the wage gap against newcomers, β, also has a negative effect on employment and raise
wages. However, conversely to the size of the FE of the union, a wider salary gap to
newcomers speeds up convergence.
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w¯ L¯ |φ|
↑ d ↑ w ↓ L ↓
↑ B ↑ w ↓ L ↔
↑ β ↑ w ↓ L ↓
↑ c ↓ w ↑ L ↑
Table 1
Sensitivity analysis
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Direct effect of symmetric adjustment costs
This subsection centers its attention on the sensitivity analysis for parameter c,
which defines the size of the symmetric quadratic adjustment costs for the firm, i.e.
the adjustment costs dependent on the number of hired or fired employees and not on
the wage rate. This analysis concludes the standard result that adjustment costs slow
down convergence. However, at the same time it conclude the counterintuitive result
that higher adjustment costs for the firm reduce wages and increase employment. These
correspond to the standard adjustment costs that grow with both hiring and firing at
an increasing rate. The effect of parameter c is illustrated assuming that it rises from
c1 to c2 > c1.
Given the reaction function of the firm in (25), the first direct effect of a higher c
is a less sloped reaction function, which implies that firm’s hiring respond less sharply
to variations in wages. Assuming a fix level of employment, the reaction functions
of the firm are plotted in Figure 5, for two different values of c, with the flatter line
corresponding to the greater value, c2. If the initial situation is a steady-state equilibrium
(w, h) for c1, a rise in c would reduce hirings from h1 to h2, so reducing marginal FE
C ′U(h2) < C
′
U(h1). As long as the responsiveness and the marginal adjustment costs are
lower, and according to the optimality condition (26), the union has an incentive to
increase wages. An increment from w1 to w2, would induce the firm to raise hirings back
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to h1 and with them, the marginal adjustment costs back to their initial value. However,
since the responsiveness of hirings to wage changes has decreased, further increments in
wages towards w3, and the corresponding increment in hirings towards h3, are required
to balance equation (26) again.
This direct effect ignores the possible effect of c on the marginal value given to the
level of employment by the firm, V ′F(L), (i.e. on the coefficients aF and bF). However,
when adjustment costs are higher, an additional employee already within the firm does
not need to be hired and for that reason is more valuable for the firm. Therefore,
the marginal value for the firm of an additional employee, V ′F(L), increases and the
reaction function of the firm shifts up-left, as depicted in Figure 6 (the y intercept shifts
up from V ′F1/c2 to V
′
F2(L)/c2). Provided that this increment in the “shadow” value of
employment for the firm is large enough, at the initial wage w1, the firm will not reduce
but increase hirings to h′1 > h1. Now, larger hirings increase marginal adjustment costs
C ′U(h2) > C
′
U(h1), leading the union to decrease wages in order to induce a reduction
in hirings. However, since the responsiveness of hirings to wages is lower, the reduction
in wages should be soft enough not to decrease hirings back to their original level h1,
because in that case condition (26) would not be satisfied (the RHS would be too low).
Hence, in the medium-run, wages are reduced, while hirings, and hence employment,
are increased. In this situation, stronger adjustment costs would lead to lower wages
and unemployment rates. A numerical simulation of this possible effect is presented in
Figure 7, which displays the time paths of wages, hirings and employment for two values
of parameter c, (0.1 and 0.3). A higher adjustment cost would lead to a steady-state
equilibrium characterized by lower wages and higher employment. However, this result
is not necessarily true along the transition. In fact, the opposite behavior takes place
over an initial time interval.
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies the collective bargaining process between a trade union and a firm,
within the framework of the monopoly union model. We consider a dynamic perspec-
tive, according to which, the employment level within the firm progressively adjusts,
converging towards a steady-state value. The employment can augment through the
accumulation of a continuous flow of new recruitments, or diminish from a continuous
flow of employees exiting the firm. This parsimonious process is based on the existence
of FE for the firm, the union, or both. The collective action bargaining process is de-
fined as a dynamic game played a` la Stackelberg between the union (leader) and the
firm (follower). The firm decides on the demand for newcomers or the layoff of current
employees. The union, aware of this dynamic demand, would choose wages so as to
manipulate the firm’s recruitment decisions in its best interest.
Hiring new employees or firing current workers involves FE for the firm, which can
be divided in two terms. First, the standard quadratic symmetric adjustment costs,
exclusively dependent on the number of employees being hired or fired. And secondly,
we incorporate a new term which makes firing costs also positively dependent on the
wage earned by the employees laid off. Furthermore, we assume wage discrimination
between incumbent and new recruited employees, which gives the firm the possibility
for wage savings by hiring new employees. Indeed, when the number of hired employees
is small, the wage savings from new recruitments outweigh the standard hiring costs
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and the firm experiences hiring benefits instead of hiring costs. Additionally, hiring and
firing also influence the union’s welfare. The union resents firings at an increasing rate,
and welcomes hirings at a decreasing rate (because of organizational problems).
To analyze the influence of the FE on wages and employment, the scenario with
no frictions is analyzed first. This is the baseline scenario in which employment and
wages adjust instantaneously, and can be consequently identified as the static case.
In this setting, the employment level and the wage rate depend only on the production
technology and the unemployment benefit. By giving entrance to FE for the trade union,
we observe that the wage increases and the employment decreases if the voluntary quit
without frictional effect is large (larger than the hiring rate which maximizes the hiring
benefits for the union); that is, if the voluntary quit (which defines hirings at the steady-
state) lies within the range at which the FE for the union are negative at the margin.
Conversely, if the union welcomes an additional employee up to very large recruitment
levels (above the voluntary quit without FE), then the existence of hiring benefits leads
the union to reduce wages, so inducing a rise in the number of newcomers and hence an
increment in employment levels.
Secondly, we compare the static case with the scenario with FE only for the firm. In
this scenario, raising wages is always rewarding for the union at the margin. Therefore,
it chooses the maximum feasible wage. Again if the rate of voluntary quit without
FE surpasses the hiring rate which maximizes wages savings from the salary gap to
newcomers, then the FE for the firm will reduce the employment level. The opposite is
not necessarily true. Since FE lead to fix a higher wage, a small rate of voluntary quit
will not necessarily lead to higher employment levels. Nevertheless, for the parameters
defining these FE, we have characterized the regions within which employment is either
raised or reduced. Frictional effects lead to a higher level of employment if: the income
gap between employed and unemployed workers is not too high; the size of the standard
convex cost for the firm is not too large; and the wage discrimination against newcomers
is strong.
We finally analyze the Stackelberg dynamic game with FE for both players. The
solution to this game is characterized by a smooth convergence of employment towards
its medium-run value from below if initially low. Under this assumption of initially
low levels of employment, wages and hiring rates will be settled at initially large values,
decreasing towards their steady-state values as employment rises. The opposite behavior
applies for an excessively large initial level of employment.
For this general case, the sensitivity analysis concludes that employment decreases
with the size of the FE for the union, or with the unemployment benefits. However,
when focusing on the FE for the firm, a twofold conclusion is obtained. On the one
hand, the wage gap against newly-hired employees which by definition is considered
identical to the effect of wages on firing costs, reduces employment. Conversely, the
standard symmetric costs only associated with the number of employees hired or fired
increase employment. This controversial result is based on the fact that these costs not
only reduce the positive responsiveness of the firm to a rise in wages, but also, and at the
same time, raise the marginal value that the firm attaches to employees. This greater
valuation increases hirings and employment. Knowing this, the monopolistic union will
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fix a lower wage in order to reduce the firm’s benefits from the wage gap to newcomers,
and hence reduce the firm’s incentive to hire. However, this effect is not enough to offset
the initial increment in hirings. In conclusion, greater symmetric standard costs for the
firm raise employment while at the same time reducing wages.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
The expression for aU reads
aU =
−[4c2 − dβΦΘ]−√∆
2βΘ
,
with Φ = ρ+ 2δ, Θ = 2(c+ d)− dβΦ and
∆ = [4c2 − dβΦΘ]2 − 4Θ [c2(2c− 2d− dβΦ)− 2d2β2] .
Under Condition 1, Θ > 0, and hence a sufficient condition for aU < 0 would be
∆ > [4c2 − dβΦΘ]2, which can be guaranteed under sufficient condition c ≤ d.
Proof of Proposition 5
From the optimal feedback strategies in (28) and (27), one gets
φ1w =
c(βaU + c)− dβaF
dβ2
, φ1h =
βaU + c
dβ
.
We have numerically seen that aF > 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for φ
1
w < 0, and
necessary and sufficient condition for φ1h < 0, is βaU + c < 0. This expression can be
written as
βaU + c =
−4c2 + dβΦΘ + 2cΘ−√∆
2βΘ
.
Since Θ > 0, a sufficient condition for a negative sign of this expression is −4c2+dβΦΘ+
2cΘ < 0, or equivalently, after some rearrangements
(31) −(dβΦ)2 + 2d(dβΦ) + 4cd < 0.
The LHS of this inequality can be interpreted as a second order polynomial in dβΦ, with
roots: d ±√d2 + cd. The inequation (31) holds true if dβΦ < d +√d2 + cd. And this
condition is immediate under Condition 1.
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